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In early 1909 the British government was shaken by a sudden and severe political crisis. 
Reports had been received that the German navy, which normally built warships 
according to a rigid and well-known construction timetable established under the nation’s 
Fleet Laws, had suddenly and in secret ordered a number of battleships of the latest 
dreadnought type ahead of its published programme, with the result that materials for 
ships not due to be commenced until April 1909 were already being assembled in 
November 1908. As it was reasonable to suppose that ships begun in advance might also 
be completed in advance, these rumours of ‘accelerated’ German shipbuilding raised a 
frightening spectre. In the public mind, Britain’s security rested upon a simple formula, 
the two-power standard, which mandated that the Royal Navy should always possess 
more modern battleships and battle cruisers than the combined forces of the next two 
strongest naval powers. In all the existing calculations of international maritime strength, 
it had been assumed that by the spring of 1912 Germany would have no more than 13 
such vessels. However, if the rumours of covert construction were to be believed, it now 
seemed likely that the German navy would possess 17 of the newest battleships; it was 
even possible that they would have as many as 21.
1
 As Britain would have completed 
only 18 ships of this type by that time, not only was it evident that the two-power 
standard was under threat, but it was even conceivable that the German navy might 
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overtake its British counterpart in the number of dreadnoughts at its disposal and thereby 
find itself in a position to mount a serious challenge for control of the North Sea. Were 
this to succeed, the invulnerability conferred upon Britain at Trafalgar and subsequently 
never seriously imperilled might be lost and, in that eventuality, invasion or starvation 
were catastrophes genuinely to be feared. 
 The prospect of Britain’s maritime supremacy being eroded in this fashion – a 
prospect that quickly became public knowledge – led to a major popular clamour for an 
immediate and substantial increase in the nation’s shipbuilding programme. Whereas a 
meagre total of two dreadnoughts had been ordered under the 1908 navy estimates, fears 
of a German acceleration led to calls for four times that number to be laid down in 1909, 
a demand famously encapsulated in the slogan ‘We want eight and we won’t wait.’ 
Although such a course of action was strongly opposed by an influential section of the 
cabinet – the economist wing headed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd 
George, and the up-and-coming Winston Churchill – after months of acrimonious debate, 
a big construction budget was eventually agreed. What ultimately ensured this outcome 
was the cabinet’s acceptance, grudging in the case of its economist members, of the 
Admiralty argument that reliable information in their possession proved that the rumours 
of a German acceleration were true and that, therefore, an immediate response was 
required. As such, the 1909 naval panic was arguably the first British military-political 
crisis of the twentieth century to be started, driven and also finally decided largely by 
intelligence assessments of a foreign threat. 
 Despite the role of secret information in first causing the acceleration scare and 
then in helping to determine its outcome, it has not been the intelligence dimension so 
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much as the impact of the crisis upon domestic politics that has attracted most of the 
attention of historians.
2
 Given that the 1909 naval panic came close to fracturing the unity 
of the cabinet, massively increased the tension between the Unionist and Liberal parties 
and necessitated a substantial increase in British armaments’ expenditure that led directly 
to Lloyd George’s groundbreaking ‘people’s budget’, this concentration on domestic 
concerns is not unreasonable. Yet, if understandable, the focus on party strife to the 
exclusion of a detailed evaluation of the intelligence assessment that lay behind the 
Admiralty’s claims has been very unfortunate. In the absence of such a study, many 
prominent historians – perhaps taking their cue from Lloyd George who acidly dismissed 
the evidence of secret German building as ‘contractors’ gossip’ and ‘false information to 
frighten us’3 – have tended to assume that the whole naval scare rested from the outset on 
the most insubstantial of evidentiary foundations. A.J.A. Morris, for example, in his 
excellent study The Scaremongers has written that fears of a ‘national peril’ were ‘based 
not upon irrefutable evidence but upon assumption and suspicion.’4 Similarly, both 
Michael Balfour and Paul Kennedy have cautiously downplayed the reliability of the 
intelligence by noting that in the end no German acceleration took place, a circumstance 
that could suggest that no such threat ever existed.
5
 Some have gone further still, hinting 
that contrivance and artifice might have rested behind the Admiralty’s use of intelligence. 
Take, for instance, Nicholas Lambert’s generalized comment that ‘the pre-war Admiralty 
was not as concerned by the German threat as many have insisted but rather exploited 
public perceptions of a challenge for political and budgetary advantage’.6 If applied to the 
1909 naval scare, this suggests that it was less reliable intelligence than the prospect of 
departmental gain that lay behind the navy’s claims of a German acceleration. 
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In the face of these arguments, all of which embody doubts about the quality of 
the material underpinning the 1909 naval scare, it is time that the nature of that 
intelligence was examined more thoroughly. This article will do that. The approach taken 
will mirror the concerns, both underlying and overt, long term and short term, of the 
crisis itself. Since the long-term underlying issue in 1909 was the anxiety that Germany 
had developed the productive capacity to build warships as quickly and in as great a 
number as Britain, the article will begin by looking at the Admiralty’s on-going 
evaluation of German naval shipbuilding capabilities. It will be suggested that this 
assessment, put together piece by piece over the years from 1905 to 1908, created a 
picture of German construction potential that, while not menacing enough to cause a 
commotion on its own, nevertheless served as a foundation and necessary precondition 
for the crisis that broke out in 1909. Supplementing concerns about German capabilities 
were suspicions about German intentions. Chief amongst these was the worry that 
Germany planned to utilize its newly enhanced shipbuilding prowess to mount a serious 
challenge to Britain’s naval supremacy. Specifically, it was feared that, by ordering ships 
in secret and then collecting the materials for their construction in advance, the German 
authorities would be able to build the vessels so rapidly that they would overtake the 
Royal Navy before the Admiralty was able to mount a response. Hence, the article will 
also look at the intelligence that was received in the Admiralty from late 1908 onwards 
that suggested that the advanced ordering and covert building of German dreadnoughts 
was taking place. This new information, it will be argued, in conjunction with the data on 
productive capacity already in the Admiralty’s possession, served as the trigger and 
driving force for the ensuing panic. Then, in the light of doubts expressed about the 
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sincerity of the Admiralty, this article will consider how reliable those in charge of 
British naval policy believed this information to be. It will conclude by comparing the 
Admiralty’s assessment of German actions with what the Germans were actually doing. 
 
The Long-Term Intelligence Roots of the Acceleration Scare: Reports on German 
Shipbuilding Capabilities 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the hub of Britain’s maritime information gathering 
system was the Naval Intelligence Department, commonly known as the NID. Owing to 
the global extent of the British Empire and the vital part that the nation’s extensive sea-
borne trade played in its prosperity, the NID had a truly mammoth job. It had to consider 
potential threats to British interests in practically every sea and ocean and, accordingly, it 
collected and assessed information on a wide range of topics from every region of the 
world. Of course, given the scale of the task at hand, it was not possible to give equal 
attention to every issue and so certain core concerns – principally those touching directly 
on Britain’s naval supremacy – were prioritized. Among the factors most fundamental to 
Britain’s maritime pre-eminence was the nation’s superior shipbuilding capabilities. At 
the start of the twentieth century, the country’s naval shipyards possessed the ability to 
construct warships both more rapidly and in greater numbers than anyone else. This was 
an enormous asset. Due to this manufacturing advantage, the British government was in 
the unique position of knowing that, were any power ever to seek to rival the Royal Navy 
by increasing their shipbuilding programme, Britain would always be able to respond 
with an even larger increase of its own. The outcome of the ensuing armaments race 
would, therefore, be a British victory, one made all the more marked by the fact that the 
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extra British ships, although begun later, would probably be finished ahead of those of 
the rival powers. Naturally, this was a lead that the Admiralty were keen to maintain and, 
accordingly, the NID kept a close watch on the efficiency and output capacity of the 
shipbuilding and armaments industries of all the major naval powers, looking for any 
signs that this invaluable productive advantage was under threat. For many years this 
monitoring had provided the Admiralty with the reassurance that, in time of need, it could 
rely upon the naval shipbuilding industry to produce vessels in greater numbers and at a 
quicker rate than any potential rival and, thus, see off any challenge to its naval 
dominance. However, in the four years up to 1909 this comfortable certainty began to 
change. Intelligence received on the German naval armaments industry suggested that a 
formidable new competitor had emerged and cast considerable doubts about whether 
Britain’s traditional lead in rapid warship building could be relied upon to counteract a 
German challenge. 
 The Admiralty’s information on Germany’s naval shipbuilding capabilities 
derived from a number of avenues. Some of it came from open sources. The staff of the 
NID scrutinized German naval legislation, poured over transcripts of the naval debates in 
the Reichstag, examined notices in the press about the launching, completion or 
commissioning of new warships, and dissected any articles they could find about 
shipbuilding in specialist periodicals such as the Marine Rundschau. Of course, while 
much of interest could be discovered in this way, nobody was under any illusion that such 
channels could be absolutely relied upon and, inevitably, the NID not only sought 
alternative avenues of information, but also looked for independent verification of open 
source materials. Acquiring this covertly was not really an option. Britain did not 
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establish a secret service until the end of 1909. Prior to then, in the absence of such an 
institution, the navy received the trifling sum of £500 a year for secret service work, an 
amount wholly inadequate for obtaining ‘special information as to the proceeding of 
foreign powers in connection with naval armaments’ on anything other than the most 
occasional basis.
7
 Given such limitations, the job of providing such corroboration fell, for 
the most part, upon the shoulders of the Royal Navy’s man in Berlin, the naval attaché.8 
Accordingly, among other duties, these officers were tasked with supplying information 
about Germany’s shipyards. To this end they undertook trips along the German coast, 
visiting such facilities as they could. In the early years of the century, the reports from 
these inspections were not alarming. Yes, Germany had a capable naval shipbuilding 
industry, but it did not rival Britain’s either in scale or efficiency. However, as the 
German navy began to expand, so, too, did the industrial infrastructure that supported it 
and, consequently, the reports from the attachés began to paint a more frightening picture 
of Germany’s warship building capacity. At first this took the form of letters about the 
increase in construction potential of individual companies as they expanded and 
modernized their yards.
9
 In isolation, such information was none too worrying. However, 
it did not take long for the attachés to recognize that this was a widespread phenomenon 
and, accordingly, they soon turned their attention to what these various individual 
improvements meant for the German naval shipbuilding industry as a whole. The first 
truly startling dispatch was penned by Captain Reginald Allenby. Addressing the 
question of whether German shipyards could undertake the reconstruction of the Tsar’s 
navy in the aftermath of its obliteration in the Russo-Japanese war, he concluded that 
they were quite able to deal with any orders: 
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Having made the round of all the German Yards, within the last 15 months, and 
giving a fairly low estimate of their capabilities, I think it may be fairly assumed 
that 4 of the best private yards could undertake to lay down 5 battleships of the 
largest size forthwith. At the end of 18 months, 5 more could be laid down and 
without doubt 10 battleships could be handed over inside 5 years. At the same 
time 4 Armoured Cruisers could be commenced and 8 vessels completed within 5 
years. Also, 4 smaller cruisers (second class) and 12 destroyers could be laid 
down and naturally completed much sooner.
10
 
 
If true, this represented an enormous output of warships. 
 Allenby’s appraisal, while worrying, was nevertheless quickly out of date. One 
month after it was written, the keel of the revolutionary new battleship HMS 
Dreadnought was laid down, inaugurating an era of much larger warships. Many of the 
slips that could formerly be used to build battleships were incapable of launching a vessel 
of the size of the Dreadnought and, thus, a new assessment of German capabilities for the 
Dreadnought era was required. This was provided by Allenby’s successor, Commander 
Philip Dumas. Appointed in February 1906, he spent much of the summer touring 
German shipyards. Upon his return to Berlin, he collated this information into a dispatch 
on Germany’s shipbuilding industry, which he believed was extremely efficient. By his 
reckoning, if the goal was to build to maximum capacity, 
 
the German shipyards could within a period of two years and nine months 
construct a battle fleet consisting of:  
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9 Battleships of the largest size, 
3 large armoured cruisers [i.e. battle cruisers], 
34 small cruisers or scouts, 
99 Destroyers. 
 
A different, but no less frightening possibility existed if speed of construction was the 
priority: 
 
if one 18,000 ton battleship was ordered from each of the following 
establishments, viz.- 
Schichau at Danzig. 
Vulkan Yard at Stettin. 
Imperial Yard at Kiel. 
Blohm & Voss at Hamburg. 
Weser Yard at Bremen. 
Imperial Yard at Wilhelmshaven. 
and directed to be completed in the shortest possible time that the whole would be 
ready in two years time.
11
 
 
If true, Germany possessed a shipbuilding industry that was capable of rivalling Britain in 
terms of both output and speed of delivery. 
Reports such as these provided information on the number of hulls that could be 
laid down and completed in a given time, vital data for any evaluation of Germany’s 
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ability to compete in an armaments race. However, despite revealing that Germany’s 
shipbuilders could complete an enormous number of vessels very rapidly, these reports 
did not, initially, cause great alarm in London. The explanation for this calm response to 
what, on the face of it, was extremely worrying news, stemmed from the logistics of 
warship construction. In the Dreadnought era, the time-constraining element in the 
building of a major warship was not the fabrication of the hull – the work of the 
shipyards – but the manufacture of the heavy guns and their mountings – the work of the 
naval ordnance industry. Owing to their engineering complexity, the numerous turrets 
required for a Dreadnought took longer to complete than the ship that would provide the 
platform for them. Consequently, any country that aspired to the rapid construction of 
large numbers of major warships needed not only a sizeable and efficient shipbuilding 
capacity but also a comparable productive capability in terms of guns and mountings. 
This was not an industry in which Germany was deficient. Heavy ordnance for the 
German navy was supplied principally by the Krupp conglomerate, which owned and ran 
an enormous industrial complex in the city of Essen. This was a company with a well 
deserved reputation. Its modern, well-equipped and efficient workshops were capable of 
rapidly turning out substantial quantities of the most advanced and the most complex 
weapons of the age.
12
 While this was common knowledge, precise information on the 
capacity of this plant and the specific details of any developments that were taking place 
there were harder to come by and, consequently, data on these points was of enormous 
interest to the Admiralty. Fortunately, the NID had ways of acquiring this. 
The best known of the Admiralty’s sources on Krupp was H. H. Mulliner, the 
manager of the Coventry Ordnance Works. Mulliner’s fame derives from the fact that in 
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August 1909, aggrieved by what he perceived as poor treatment at the hands of an 
ungrateful Admiralty, he wrote a letter to The Times in which he disclosed his history as 
an informant on the German armaments industry. The story, which raised a violent 
political storm, also achieved considerable press coverage during the remainder of 1909, 
not least because Mulliner published several more inflammatory letters in various 
national newspapers. It then became an issue in the January 1910 election and continued 
to be controversial during the ensuing parliamentary session. Moreover, it was later given 
further publicity when in 1935 a Royal Commission on the private manufacture of arms 
examined his case. Due to the considerable attention afforded to his story, it has long 
been common knowledge that Mulliner, supplied information to the British government. 
In particular, it is well-documented that in May 1906 Mulliner informed the Admiralty, 
through General Hadden at the War Office, that Krupp was massively expanding its plant 
at Essen and had installed new machinery there that could only be intended to facilitate 
an increase in its already substantial output of heavy guns and mountings.
13
 
While Mulliner’s indiscretions make him the navy’s highest profile source on 
Krupp, this does not mean that he was their most important channel. To begin with, as the 
manager of a firm that stood to benefit directly from any increase in British naval 
spending – the consequence of his information being taken seriously – he was not 
regarded as a disinterested party by the Admiralty. A minute by Captain Henry Jackson, 
Controller of the Navy, on Mulliner’s 1906 letter speaks volumes about their attitude 
towards him. It ran: ‘A confirmation of this intelligence from an unprejudiced source is 
desirable.’14 
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In addition to concerns about Mulliner’s impartiality, there are also questions 
about the value of his information. While some of the specific details he supplied about 
lathes, cranes and roller paths provided fresh insights, his general point about the 
enlargement of Krupp was not exactly news. Between 1903 and 1908, at a cost of more 
than 28 million marks, the plant at Essen grew at an average of 5.2 acres per annum.
15
 
Regular increases on this scale were not something that could be hidden and it is, 
therefore, hardly surprising that the Admiralty were aware of this development even 
before Mulliner first made contact. As Rear-Admiral Sir John Jellicoe explained in an 
internal Admiralty document from 1909 concerning some of Mulliner’s revelations to the 
press, ‘we knew in 1905 that Krupps works at Essen were being extended.’16 Sadly, the 
actual paper stating how the Admiralty knew about this is no longer attached to Jellicoe’s 
minute. However, information still available allows for an informed guess as to the basis 
of this statement. 
Possibly because they hoped to attract orders from overseas, or because the 
German government directed them to do so in order to obtain reciprocal facilities abroad, 
Krupp’s directors often permitted serving officers from foreign powers, including Britain, 
to inspect their establishments. Thus, in 1901 Colonel C. H. Scott of the Royal Artillery 
was taken round the company’s works, as was Colonel Gleichen, the British military 
attaché, in 1904.
17
 More significantly, in 1905, Captain Allenby was invited. As 
Allenby’s report is lost, we don’t know for certain what he saw, but his diary fills some 
of the gaps. For example, it tells us that he witnessed armour plate being rolled, the 
component parts of a 17 cm gun being moulded, as well as various shops for the 
manufacture of ammunition. It also reveals that he was impressed by the scale of Krupp’s 
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operation, noting that over 50,000 people worked for the firm. Unfortunately, being a 
private rather than an official record, it dwells less on technicalities than on matters of 
personal interest. Thus, we learn more about his hotel room – it was large and had a bath 
en suite – and about his meeting with Bertha Krupp – she was apparently very nice 
looking and spoke excellent English – than we do about any intelligence Allenby may 
have acquired.
18
 In particular, we do not discover if he noticed or reported the expansion 
of the works. Despite this, it is likely that he did, for the simple reason that all other 
visitors to the plant at this time observed that building was taking place. The American 
naval attaché, for example, who toured Essen shortly after Allenby, reported that 
‘expansion is noticeable in every direction and especially in the armor [sic] plate and gun 
shops.’19 It is barely conceivable that Allenby would have failed to spot and comment on 
something that was so obvious and so important. And, if he reported it, this would 
explain how the NID knew about such developments the year before Mulliner sent his 
infamous letter. 
Thus, probably not coincidentally, following Allenby’s inspection, the Admiralty 
kept a close watch on Krupp. Especially active was Allenby’s successor, Dumas, who 
first visited Essen in September 1906. He was struck by the massive redevelopment of 
the facilities, recording: ‘Although they denied that they were undertaking any special 
increase in their works, yet signs of new construction and rebuilding are visible 
everywhere…’20 Eight months later, he reported again, this time focusing on the 
‘extension of Krupp’s gun factory.’21 Then, in August, visiting the works a second time, 
he once more noted the expansion: 
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During my visit it was plain that an immense amount of re-construction and re-
building work is in progress and I elicited that two huge workshops each with a 
ground floor of 22,000 square metres, also some smaller ones, are in process of 
construction for the Imperial German Navy and Prussian orders alone.
22
 
 
Finally, two months later, Dumas wrote to Captain Slade, the new Director of Naval 
Intelligence (DNI): ‘I believe that Krupp is now building shops for German Government 
work alone which should be fully able to cope with all possible requirements of the 
future… The new shops, I may say, I saw myself.’23 
Due to Dumas’s endeavours, the NID was well aware of the expansion of the 
Krupp works and was not reliant on external informants such as Mulliner. This became 
clear when, in July 1908, Mulliner contacted the Admiralty with further news about 
Krupp. Mulliner’s information was passed to Slade. Citing Dumas, Slade remarked that 
Mulliner’s information merely ‘confirms the reports we have been receiving from time to 
time’; it added nothing new.24 
 As we can see, the Admiralty received intelligence from its own sources on both 
the capacity of German shipyards and the development of the Krupp plant. This 
established that if Germany desired to increase or accelerate her naval programme by 
building additional warships and/or doing so faster, she had the industrial strength to do 
so. Slade concluded: 
 
The information … points to the preparation of such facilities as will enable 
Germany to fully employ all her shipbuilding yards in building the largest type of 
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ship… The only limitation on her power of doing this has been the difficulty of 
dealing with the guns and mounting required. … It is evident that, when the new 
plant now being erected by Messrs Krupp is in working order, it will easily be 
able to keep pace with the shipbuilding. … we may therefore expect that Germany 
could … double their present output.25 
 
In Slade’s view, this meant that Germany could lay down eight or nine battleships each 
year, with completion assured in two and a half to three years. Given that an assessment 
by the Admiralty, produced two months previously, had concluded that the maximum 
British output was ‘6 per annum … delivered two years from the date of order,’26 it was 
clear that, if Slade’s evaluation was correct – a doubtful proposition, as we shall later see 
– Germany could build battleships in as great a number and at a comparable tempo to 
Britain. 
At the theoretical level, this was a worrying assessment, which might have 
produced a stir were it not for the fact that the ability to increase production and the 
intention to do so are not the same. Various factors, say, political or financial 
considerations, potentially stood in the way of Germany building to maximum capacity. 
Hence, so long as the NID received no evidence that the German naval programme was 
actually being increased, the intelligence about enhanced productive capabilities did not 
unduly worry them. However, it was always evident that, should information emerge that 
the German naval programme was actually being advanced, then the intelligence already 
collected would become a factor of the greatest importance. In late 1908, such 
information began to surface. 
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The Intelligence Trigger for the Crisis: Information about Covert and Accelerated 
Shipbuilding 
Whispers that Germany intended to accelerate its shipbuilding programme by 
commencing work on the 1909 vessels ahead of schedule first circulated in Berlin in late 
July 1908. The American naval attaché was first to record the matter, reporting that the 
Germans contemplated ‘laying down a fourth battleship this year … notwithstanding that 
there is no money in the Budget for such fourth ship.’27 Interestingly, although the British 
and American naval attachés consistently pooled information, there does not appear to 
have been a comparable dispatch from Dumas. The explanation for this appears to be that 
Dumas never compiled one but decided to deliver this news verbally. This choice, 
surprising on the face of it, makes sense given Dumas’s position at this time. Recently 
designated as the new Flag Captain on the South Africa Station, his term as attaché was 
due to end on 31 July. Thus, the precise moment that rumours of extra German building 
began to circulate was the beginning of Dumas’s last week in Germany. This was an 
extremely busy time for the attaché, who was then preoccupied with producing a lengthy 
final dispatch.
28
 Yet, if Dumas had few immediate opportunities to focus on anything 
other than this report, he knew that on his return to London he would have audiences at 
Buckingham Palace, the Admiralty and Foreign Office. These interviews provided the 
perfect opportunity to report anything important that might have happened in Berlin in 
his concluding week. While no formal written record of these meetings exists, according 
to Dumas’s diary, his conversation with Admiral Fisher focused on ‘the German navy & 
the powers of construction there.’29 Sadly, this is not a very precise entry and, while a 
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discussion along those lines could have been about accelerated building, the vagueness of 
Dumas’s wording means one cannot say so for certain. Fortunately, Dumas subsequently 
amplified on the matter. In a diary entry from March 1909 and a private letter from mid-
April, he stated that he had reported the extra German construction in the first week of 
August 1908, telling the Admiralty that the ships were ‘commenced to provide work for 
the German shipyards in a period of great commercial depression.’30 He made the same 
assertion in his memoirs: ‘I particularly desired to make both [Fisher and the Foreign 
Office] realise that almost wholly for business purposes and so as not to discharge men, 
the Germans were slightly anticipating dates in laying down two of their ships for next 
year’s programme’.31 While retrospective claims are inherently suspect, it is notable that 
ten days after Dumas’s conversation with Fisher, the latter wrote to Reginald McKenna, 
the First Lord, informing him of ‘a report the Germans are going to lay down an extra 
dreadnought to take advantage of slackness of work in German dockyards.’32 This is, 
almost to the word, what Dumas claimed he had told Fisher. Fisher’s remark, therefore, 
lends credence to Dumas’s claim. 
Fisher’s disclosure to McKenna that the Germans were contemplating the 
construction of an extra Dreadnought is not the only revealing aspect of his letter. The 
Admiral continued: ‘By November we ought to know the truth of this.’ Quite how he was 
going to verify this rumour, Fisher did not say. However, in the light of this comment, the 
activities of Dumas’s successor bear scrutiny. In the second week of August, just after 
Dumas’s audience took place, at the very moment Fisher was writing to McKenna and 
almost immediately after Captain Herbert Heath’s arrival in Germany, the new attaché 
embarked on a whirlwind tour of the country’s naval ports. While this alone does not 
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prove that Heath was looking specifically for evidence of acceleration, it is notable that, 
following his visit to Kiel and Hamburg, he reported: ‘In my opinion the [German naval] 
programme could be accelerated so far as ship building is concerned.’33 In a report that 
makes no other mention of building rates, this was a remark out of place; unless, that is, it 
was an answer to a question that the attaché had been set prior to the start of this tour of 
the shipyards. 
 If, as seems likely, Dumas reported in early August that accelerated building was 
taking place and Heath was immediately given instructions to verify this, unsurprising the 
new attaché did not take long to find the evidence. On 13 October 1908 the Berliner 
Tageblatt reported that orders for two battleships of the 1909 programme, due to be 
awarded after 1 April 1909, had already been assigned. This story was promptly 
confirmed by Heath in a private letter to the DNI.
34
 This would be only the first of many 
such communications. A week later Heath reported: 
 
The estimates for /09-/10 are not yet published, but there seems no doubt that the 
contracts for two of the battleships for that year’s programme have already been 
placed. This is six months at least before the usual time, and before the money has 
actually been voted.
35
 
 
Then at the start of November he told the British chargé d’affaires that ‘there seems to be 
a good deal of truth’ in the rumour ‘that the three battleships which according to the 
Naval programme are to be laid down in the financial year beginning on the 1st of April 
1909 had already been taken in hand.’ He continued: ‘the preparation of the material – a 
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lengthy part of the business – has … already begun, although normally no money should 
be available for these ships until next financial year.’36 This verbal report was naturally 
forwarded to the authorities in London, to whom Heath also reported in person two days 
later.
37
 This was followed up two weeks later when Heath, now back in Berlin, 
supplemented this with the information ‘that material is now being collected, and 
preparation being made to start building early in the new financial year.’38 
What Heath had begun in 1908, he continued in 1909. In January, he wrote that 
‘Schichau have commenced collecting their material for a battleship of the [19]09-[19]10 
programme.’39 He also reported that, while money had yet to be voted by the Reichstag 
for this work, this represented no obstacle, as ‘sums not spent in one year may apparently 
be carried over to succeeding years without further question.’40 Then, in March, he stated 
that a German naval officer had informed him that ‘all private shipbuilders … if they 
thought there was a “possibility” of getting an order for a battleship, they would probably 
prepare material in “anticipation”.’41 Finally, in May, he reported that measures were 
being taken to prevent him visiting Schichau’s works in Danzig, which had become the 
main focus of British suspicions. Heath’s first application to inspect this yard had been 
made in August 1908 and had met with a blanket refusal. An application made in early 
1909 was likewise turned down. Heath entertained no doubts as to the reason. Referring 
to the 1909-1910 programme year battleship that had allegedly only just been started 
there – the ersatz Frithjof (future SMS Oldenburg)42 – and which he was unable to 
inspect, he sarcastically remarked: ‘It would have been interesting to see how far she had 
advanced in seven weeks.’43 Clearly, he believed his visit had been prevented because the 
Germans needed to keep their accelerated building out of sight. 
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 The documents cited above demonstrate that a considerable corpus of information 
on acceleration came from Heath. While necessarily taken seriously in the Admiralty, 
some form of independent corroboration was obviously desirable. For such intelligence 
the Admiralty turned to one of its most consistent and reliable channels of information, 
Sir Trevor Dawson. 
 Dawson was a former naval officer, who had resigned from the service in 1896 to 
become first Superintendent of Ordnance at Vickers and later chairman of the company’s 
Artillery and Shipbuilding Management Board. Yet, despite transforming into a full-time 
businessman, Dawson maintained close contacts with the navy. Indeed, he became a 
major conduit of intelligence, presumably being trusted – unlike Mulliner – because of 
his naval background. His information was obtained by three methods. First, as someone 
who visited the establishments of other armament manufacturers, Dawson was in a 
position to supply the Admiralty with his own observations about developments on the 
continent. Some of these observations were serendipitous, in that Dawson always carried 
out his job with his eyes open and recorded what he saw. However, his work also 
provided him with the perfect cover for conducting dedicated intelligence missions and it 
is clear that several of Dawson’s trips to Germany were not undertaken for business 
purposes, but were made specifically at the Admiralty’s request. As well as acting 
directly on the Admiralty’s behalf, Dawson also ran agents for them. Some of these men 
conducted industrial espionage on his behalf with Dawson passing the results on to the 
NID. In other cases, he appears to have introduced potential agents directly to the 
Admiralty. Finally, Dawson was also in a position to hand to the Admiralty commercially 
sensitive information acquired in the normal course of Vickers’ business. All of these 
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means of acquiring information were utilized on the Admiralty’s behalf in 1909, when 
the need arose for independent corroboration of Heath’s reports. 
 Beginning with the issue of intelligence collected through missions undertaken by 
Dawson himself, there is evidence that from at least 1906 Dawson was a regular visitor to 
continental Europe, travelling there on many occasions on the Admiralty’s behalf.44 
Much of the information he supplied from these trips related to the ballistic properties of 
foreign ordnance, on which Dawson was an expert, but he also visited shipyards. In early 
1909, with several of the most important shipbuilding firms barred to the naval attaché, 
Dawson’s ability to find out about the goings-on in these facilities was much in demand. 
In particular, it was hoped in the Admiralty that he would be able to cast some light on 
the rumour that ships had been ordered ahead of schedule at Blohm und Voss of 
Hamburg and at the Schichau works in Danzig.
45
 Accordingly, in late February, he set off 
for Germany. Stopping first in Hamburg, he was, to his surprise, allowed by Blohm und 
Voss to inspect the commercial, if not the naval, part of their yard. While this was 
obviously restricting, the vistas from the commercial areas were more than adequate for 
seeing what was being built in the rest of the yard and, thus, Dawson was able to state 
categorically that no additional warships beyond those already known about had been laid 
down. At the same time, he also reported two suspicious facts. First, that work was being 
hurried on one of the ships under construction, possibly with a view to clearing the slip 
quickly for a new vessel; second, that material was being assembled in advance for a 
vessel that had yet been laid down. The plating shop, in particular, seemed to be more 
active than the existing orders would have merited. 
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 Leaving Hamburg, Dawson proceeded to Danzig, where he called at the Schichau 
Works. Here he was not so lucky: ‘I was met here with a frank refusal to be allowed to 
enter the works on any pretext without a written order from the Minister of Marine.’ 
Undeterred, Dawson ‘walked on the rough ice in front of the Shipyard and made the best 
inspection possible by this and other means.’ What he saw was significant. The yard was 
known to have recently commenced the building of a small cruiser. To Dawson’s 
surprise, this vessel had already been launched and on the vacated slip work had already 
commenced on the keel of a large battleship.
46
 Dawson’s conclusion, confirmed by a 
local resident who helped him ‘across some somewhat dangerous looking ice’, was that 
the cruiser ‘appeared to have been launched in advance of her proper time so as to make 
room for the battleship.’47 As the contract for the battleship was not due to be settled until 
1 April, the fact that it had already been laid down – which could only have happened if 
the process of gathering material had begun even earlier still – was clear evidence of 
accelerated building. 
 In addition to undertaking reconnaissance for the Admiralty, Dawson had been a 
source of agents for them since the Boer War, during which Dawson had put them in 
touch with a certain Mr Schauenberg, who, according to Fisher, undertook ‘very secret 
work’ and was ‘absolutely trustworthy’.48 Just how many agents Dawson handled for the 
Admiralty is unknown, but during the 1909 scare, Dawson provided information from a 
‘friend’ in Germany, who appeared to have inside knowledge of the Krupp works as well 
as access to the German shipyards. Sadly, only one of his memoranda survives. However, 
in it, he related that Germany possessed the capability to expand its shipbuilding 
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programme and that finance and politics were unlikely to stand in the way of this.
49
 In 
May 1909, with other sources suggesting the same thing, this may have been influential. 
 Finally, Dawson also forwarded commercial intelligence obtained by Vickers in 
the course of its business. In the past this had included such sensitive matters as details of 
French and American submarine construction.
50
 Additionally, for many years, Dawson 
had been able to pass on information about German nickel purchases. This was important 
because nickel was an essential ingredient of armour plate and heavy ordnance. Thus, any 
increase in purchases of this metal normally indicated an increase in either current 
production or intended production of war materials. At times of international tension this 
could be vital information and, for this reason, Dawson had forwarded information about 
German nickel orders at such key moments as the First Moroccan Crisis.
51
 He would also 
do so during the acceleration scare. It was through Dawson that the Admiralty learnt that 
one of Germany’s principal nickel producers, the Franckenstein Works, had stopped 
exporting the metal, and was now only selling it within Germany, thereby adding some 
700 tons to domestic stockpiles. Dawson also reported that for the second half of 1909 
Krupp was making unusually heavy purchases of nickel – a staggering 1020 tons, a figure 
that approximated to the entire annual consumption of all the principal British armaments 
firms put together.
52
 The Admiralty drew the obvious conclusion: ‘the manufacture of 
armaments and armour is proceeding on a great scale,’ one commensurate with an 
accelerated naval shipbuilding programme.
53
 
 As demonstrated, Dawson provided a great deal of intelligence to the Admiralty. 
His information concerning a German acceleration arrived after the initial alarm had been 
raised by the naval attaché and acted as an important source of corroboration. What made 
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it especially valuable was that Dawson was able to report on shipyards to which Heath 
was unable to gain access. He also supplied agents’ reports, as well as information on 
German stockpiling of essential raw materials. 
Given the volume and quality of the information that Heath and Dawson 
provided, it is hardly surprising that when Sir Vincent Baddeley, a senior Admiralty 
official, reflected in later life on the 1909 panic he recalled that the most important 
sources were the naval attaché and Dawson.
54
 While this judgement is consonant with the 
evidence, the story would be incomplete without acknowledging that additional data was 
supplied by a variety of other informants, many of whom provided useful intelligence on 
a one off basis. One such conduit was the British military attaché in Constantinople, 
Colonel Conyers Surtees. In December 1908, he had a discussion with a representative of 
another German armaments firm, Erhardt, who told him that Krupp had recently 
purchased ‘enormous quantities of heavy machinery … for … manufacturing big guns 
and big naval mountings ... far in excess of any requirements for the existing naval 
programme of Germany.’ This had been done so that Germany could ‘secretly prepare all 
the mountings, ships’ plates, ammunition, &c., at Krupp’s, and then to suddenly 
commence the creation of a number of battleships sufficient to, at least, equal the naval 
strength of England.’55 This was startling news, but it was news that was also emerging 
from other sources. For example, the NID heard in January 1908 that Krupp had ordered 
a 4,000 ton forging press from Davy Brothers of Sheffield.
56
 There was also foreign 
corroboration. In 1909, an Argentine commission sent to visit foreign shipbuilding 
facilities with a view to future orders, inspected the Krupp works and various German 
shipyards. Upon reaching Britain, they shared their impressions with the Admiralty, 
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imparting the news that approximately one hundred large naval guns were ‘nearing 
completion’ at Essen. Additionally, they reported that at least 12 battleships were already 
under construction; that building slips would soon be vacant for a further four; and that 
facilities existed to complete the guns and mountings for these and any further vessels the 
Germans desired to lay down. Finally, they stressed that one of these vessels, although 
not due to be ordered officially for a further month, was already four months into 
construction.
57
 In other words, they provided confirmation both that acceleration could 
take place and that it was already taking place. In the context of the information already 
supplied by Heath and Dawson this extra material meant that the Admiralty possessed 
data from several different avenues, independent as well as in-house, all pointing to the 
fact that ships of the 1909 German programme had been ordered in advance, with 
materials being collected and keels being laid months before the designated time. 
 
Admiralty Assessments of Intelligence on German Acceleration 
It is clear that the Admiralty received data pointing to accelerated building. However, 
intelligence is not only about gathering information, it is also about assessing it. Just 
because the Admiralty was in possession of reports, does not mean that it regarded them 
as credible. This fact is relevant to the 1909 naval scare, because it has been suggested 
that the Admiralty never really gave credence to these reports, but utilized them to 
frighten a sceptical Cabinet and a gullible public into authorizing a large naval building 
programme. Does this accusation stand up to scrutiny? To answer this, it is necessary to 
determine whether the key players among the naval authorities believed the intelligence 
they received and circulated. 
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 That the First Lord, Reginald McKenna, sincerely believed in the existence and 
dangers of an accelerated German shipbuilding programme is hardly open to doubt. Not 
only was McKenna a man of the utmost integrity, but by instinct and political 
background he was the last person one would expect to find arguing for naval increases. 
A former Financial Secretary to the Treasury, who had always been a strict advocate of 
retrenchment, particularly when it came to defence spending, he had been appointed First 
Lord by Herbert Asquith in early 1908 largely because the new Prime Minister wanted 
someone who would take a sceptical line on the navy’s burgeoning appetite for funding. 
McKenna understood his expected role and fully intended to carry it out. It represented a 
major and potentially embarrassing political u-turn, as well as a big blow to his 
economist credentials when, as Fisher put it, McKenna agreed ‘to eat every word he has 
said at the Treasury and Cabinet’ and accept that a big building programme was needed 
in 1909. Indeed, so great was the transformation in McKenna’s position that an ecstatic 
First Sea Lord described this outcome, with customary modesty, as ‘perhaps the greatest 
triumph ever known’.58 Yet, if calling for six battleships was risky, the demand for eight 
that McKenna embraced in 1909, a demand that needed to be backed by the credible 
threat of resignation, put both his reputation and his future political career on the line. No 
politician takes such steps lightly and the fact that McKenna did so can only be explained 
by a genuine conviction in the value of the intelligence presented to him. Fisher certainly 
believed that this was McKenna’s motivation, explaining to the King: ‘Herculean efforts 
of which we know secretly and certainly, are being made by Germany to push on their 
Dreadnoughts – so much so that McKenna, who when he came here was an extreme 
“little Navy” man, is now an ultra “Big Navy” man’.59 McKenna’s private 
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correspondence reinforces this impression. Throughout the crisis, he repeatedly argued 
that it was solely German actions that propelled him to turn his political career on its head 
and advocate unpalatable increases in the estimates. Thus, in December 1909 he informed 
Asquith that he was convinced of three facts: first that ‘Germany is anticipating the 
shipbuilding programme laid down by the Law of 1907’; second, that ‘she is doing so 
secretly’; and finally that ‘German capacity to build Dreadnoughts is at this moment 
equal to ours.’ Likewise, he told Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, ‘speaking for 
myself I have no doubt whatever that Germany means to build to the full extent of her 
capacity.’60 He clearly meant it. 
 Another believer in the intelligence underpinning the 1909 naval scare was Slade, 
the DNI. As the main recipient of much of the information coming into the Admiralty, he 
had, for two reasons, long been uneasy about a possible German effort to contest British 
naval supremacy. First, he was more worried than most that the output capacity of 
Germany’s armaments industry gave them the means to contest British naval supremacy. 
As he wrote, it was a ‘false assumption’ to believe ‘that we can build faster than 
Germany. We may have been able to do so in 1905 but we cannot do so now.’61 This 
calculation would not have mattered if Slade had been persuaded of Germany’s friendly 
disposition, but he was not. Germany, he feared, ever desirous of more power and 
influence, might one day make an ‘irrational attempt to cut the Gordian Knot with the 
sword.’62 Consequently, when he received the news of Germany secretly ordering 
battleships in advance, he took the matter very seriously. Not only did he believe it, 
noting in his diary his certain conviction that ‘Germany intends to lay down 8 ships 
between now and next Christmas year,’63 but he was also extremely worried by the 
 28 
implications. If Germany started her ships ‘six months ahead of the financial year, about 
eight months before the money is voted and about fourteen months before the British 
ships of a corresponding year are allotted,’ he minuted, there was ‘no reason why 
Germany should not complete her ships in little more than two years …’64 In that event, 
Britain’s lead in dreadnoughts could easily be endangered. 
 The evident conviction of Slade with regard to the reality of German acceleration 
was shared by the junior Sea Lords, who collectively took a very robust attitude during 
the 1909 scare. At one level this was not surprising, since it mirrored the position that 
they had taken in December 1907 when the cabinet had sought to trim the 1908 navy 
estimates. As Ruddock Mackay has demonstrated, during these debates, the junior Sea 
Lords, led by Vice-Admiral Sir William May, had proven more willing than Fisher to 
press the case for higher naval spending, even going to the extent of drawing up a 
memorandum for the Cabinet warning of the consequences of the proposed cuts. 
Furthermore, they pushed a reluctant Fisher into signing this document.
65
 They showed a 
similar resolution over the 1909 programme. Again it was May who took the lead. He 
informed Fisher as early as September 1908 that, if the First Lord was resolute in pushing 
for a big construction programme, he could rely upon the backing of the Sea Lords.
66
 As 
we have seen, McKenna did stick to his convictions and the Sea Lords did back him. On 
15 January 1909 they collectively signed a statement vouching for the reality of the 
German acceleration and pressing the case for appropriate countermeasures.
67
 To 
emphasize the seriousness of the issue, they also let it be known that they would resign en 
masse if their warnings were not heeded. Why did they go to this extreme? The reason 
the junior sea lords took this step was a firm conviction in the accuracy of their 
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intelligence. This is confirmed by a private letter by Sir Alfred Winsloe, the Fourth Sea 
Lord, to Sir Henry Jackson, who had formerly been a colleague of Winsloe’s on the 
Board. Winsloe had promised to keep Jackson ‘au fait’ with events at the Admiralty and, 
accordingly, wrote him a long letter explaining the background to what he called the Sea 
Lords’ ‘ultimatum’: 
 
There has lately been enormous activity in Germany. The Gov[ernmen]t have 
been lending money to contractors to advance the ships before the contract time 
and they also gave the orders in Nov[ember] for the ships which should be laid 
down in March next, thereby advancing them by 4 months. … They have also 
made enormous purchases of Nickel for armour. We now calculate that by April 
1912 she will have 17 Dreadnoughts completed and if she were to go on again 
next year as this, it would be possible for her to have 21. …Consequently we 
cannot afford to hesitate.
68
 
 
As Winsloe had no reason to misrepresent matters in a private letter to another senior 
officer, we can accept this as clear evidence of the Fourth Sea Lord’s perspective, and of 
the junior Sea Lords in general. 
 While it is clear that the First Lord, the DNI and the junior Sea Lords all believed 
in a German acceleration, what of Fisher, the First Sea Lord? The difficulties of 
ascertaining Fisher’s true opinions are well known. This is not for want of documentary 
evidence. Fisher was a prolific writer, who never hid behind ambiguities. Indeed, few 
could express themselves as strongly as he. Unfortunately, Fisher was also someone who 
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chose his arguments to fit the moment, altered them at will, and expressed views that 
contradicted previous statements whenever it was expedient to do so. Consequently, his 
utterances need to be treated with care and no statement, however emphatic, can be taken 
as a gospel indication of Fisher’s opinions. Consequently, just because he was adamant in 
1909 that Britain ‘ought to build as fast as ever we can’ because ‘the Germans could 
certainly have 21 dreadnoughts in April 1912 if they wished it,’ does not prove his 
conviction.
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 Likewise, the fact that in later life he vigorously denied having ‘engineered 
a German Naval scare … in order to get bigger British Naval estimates’, telling Tirpitz, 
his accuser, ‘you lie Sir, and you know it!’, cannot necessarily be accepted at face 
value.
70
 Nevertheless, while one cannot always judge Fisher by his words, his deeds do 
suggest that he believed the rumours of a German acceleration. In particular, there is the 
extremely robust position he took over the 1909 estimates, a stance that contrasted 
markedly with the accommodating attitude he had adopted in previous years when 
haggling needed to be done over naval funding. Appointed First Sea Lord in 1904 
because he was the only senior Admiral who promised economies, he had served on a 
series of Boards that had lowered the estimates and kept them at a substantially reduced 
level. On top of this, for several years he had agreed to a sizeable reduction in the 
construction budget.  Moreover, as we have seen, in the battle over the 1908 estimates, 
Fisher had been extremely circumspect in pushing the case for naval spending, proving 
far less willing than his fellow Sea Lords to take a stand against the Cabinet’s demands 
for cuts and far more willing than they to accept a compromise solution, even if it 
involved unpalatable reductions in expenditure. Yet, if his previous history as First Sea 
Lord had shown Fisher as a willing accomplice to ‘economist’ measures, his actions in 
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defence of the 1909 estimates were of a different order. On this occasion, he fought tooth 
and nail for first six and then eight dreadnoughts. ‘[W]e are not going to accept 4 ships!’ 
he wrote with considerable emphasis to Viscount Knollys, the King’s Private Secretary.71 
This was a course of action that was certain to erode Fisher’s support in the Cabinet, 
much to his disadvantage in connection with his long-running rivalry with Lord Charles 
Beresford, which was then coming to a climax. That he took it regardless suggests that he 
felt it was warranted by the information available. 
 It is worth emphasising that, if the key individuals within the British naval 
hierarchy were convinced by the intelligence of a German acceleration, the Admiralty as 
a corporate entity was no less certain. An examination of the Admiralty’s various printed 
appreciations of German naval shipbuilding, documents that had no propagandistic 
purpose, but were created purely for internal distribution within the navy in order better 
to inform key officers, reveals that it was an article of faith within the Naval Intelligence 
Department that in late 1908 Germany covertly accelerated its shipbuilding programme. 
One example comes from the entry on Germany in the April 1909 edition of the NID’s 
regular publication Reports on Foreign Naval Affairs. It states that in respect of ‘two 
large ships of this year’s (1909-10) programme … preparations were undoubtedly made 
in advance to commence their construction at the beginning of the financial year.’72 
Admittedly, this assessment was made at the height of the 1909 naval scare, when one 
would not expect an Admiralty document to do anything other than advance the official 
line. However, it is revealing that even four years later, when the scare had long since 
subsided, the same position was taken. Thus, one find that in the January 1913 edition of 
the NID print ‘Shipbuilding Capabilities of the Principal Naval Powers’ it is stated as 
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indisputable fact that both the Oldenburg and the Goeben had their contracts 
‘conditionally allotted in Autumn 1908.’73 Clearly, belief in German acceleration not 
only ran deep in the Royal Navy, but was also a conviction that was long lasting. 
 
Conclusion 
At the end of March 1909, Admiral von Tirpitz made a statement in the Reichstag. He 
was forced to admit that in the autumn of 1908, several moths before they were due to be 
given out, contracts for the battleship ersatz Frithjof (the future SMS Oldenburg) and the 
battle cruiser H (subsequently SMS Goeben) had been promised to the Schichau Works 
at Danzig and Blohm und Voss of Hamburg.
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 As he explained it, this action was not an 
underhand attempt to deceive the British, but had been done simply to secure a better 
price. It did not imply that the ships were to be built more quickly and the contractors 
were aware that no money would be handed over until it had been voted by the 
Reichstag. If the shipyards began work early – in order, say, to retain workmen who 
would otherwise be discharged, as Tirpitz claimed was the case in regard to Schichau – 
this was not at the instigation of the Reichsmarineamt, which expected delivery of the 
vessels 36 months from the official contract date of 1 April 1909. 
 Tirpitz’s statement was significant because it proved that the Admiralty’s 
information that contracts had been awarded ahead of schedule and that work had been 
started in advance was neither ‘contractors’ gossip’ nor ‘false information to frighten us’. 
They really did have intelligence on the topic, it came from a multitude of sources and, 
by Tirpitz’s own admission, it was right. Thus, when the naval authorities pressed for an 
immediate British response, there are no reasons to suspect insincerity. 
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On the other hand, the inference drawn in London that ships begun ahead of 
schedule would be completed ahead of schedule did not prove to be true. Neither the 
Oldenburg nor the Goeben entered service early. Part of the reason for this was that both 
vessels were built at a leisurely pace. However, it must also be recognized that the NID 
significantly overestimated the speed at which the Germans could construct and equip 
large warships. Although Tirpitz had long sought to reduce the time needed to complete 
ship orders, much to his displeasure, it was still true in 1909 that Germany’s shipyards 
took between 36 and 40 months to complete large vessels. A German acceleration in the 
sense of faster building rates was, therefore, impossible. This begs the question why the 
Admiralty so substantially misjudged this. It is difficult to be absolutely certain about 
this, as the full basis for the Admiralty’s judgement of German capabilities is not spelt 
out in the surviving documentation, but the most likely answer is that the error related to 
the nature of the available intelligence. As we have seen, the reports on German 
constructive capacity received in NID focused, unsurprisingly and, indeed, accurately, on 
the excellent facilities available in the German shipyards and ordnance factories and on 
the superb organization of the firms that ran them. Taking no other issues into 
consideration, it is easy to see why Admiralty officials might conclude that these 
admirable qualities would translate into a rapid output capacity. However, the reality was 
that two other factors countered and overturned these advantages. First, there was the 
German navy’s rather onerous and complex procurement system, which tended to cause 
significant construction overruns as a result of hasty design changes, the necessary 
correction of avoidable errors and failed or late inspections of important parts. Secondly, 
there were the particular circumstances surrounding German armour manufacturing.  
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Almost all the protective plating used by the German navy was made by the Krupp-
Dillinger combine, whose monopoly position made it next to impossible for the 
Reichsmarineamt to pressure them to adhere to, let alone improve, their delivery 
schedules. As a result, this most vital of components rarely appeared to deadline, 
retarding the entire warship-building process.
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 It is notable that, while the superb 
organization of German ordnance factories and shipyards was well known in London, the 
surviving Admiralty intelligence papers show little recognition either of the bureaucratic 
hurdles created by the Reichsmarineamt or of the construction bottlenecks caused by the 
slow delivery of armour plate. With only one part of the picture before it – and that the 
part most favourable to Germany – it is not surprising that the Admiralty concluded that 
the Reich possessed a greater constructive capacity than was really the case. It was an 
error, but an understandable one. 
 The significance of this error is twofold. First, while real and accurate intelligence 
underlay the 1909 naval scare, it shows that, as ever, the way in which intelligence is 
assessed is more crucial than the underlying information. As we have seen, the Admiralty 
consistently applied the worst possible interpretation to the news they received from 
Germany, assuming hostile intent and a desire to deceive on the part of the German naval 
authorities. Again, in the absence of definite information on this point, it is hard to say 
why they did this. Simple paranoia is one potential explanation. However, given how 
hard-nosed and calculating many of these decision-makers were, this cannot be 
considered likely. It is also conceivable that the information before them allowed the 
members of the Board, many of whom were deeply suspicious of Germany already, to 
express with certainty that which they already believed about German hostility. If so, and 
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this is far from certain, then they fell into the trap that raw intelligence data often creates, 
of allowing people to believe what they want to believe rather than guiding them to a new 
or alternative understanding. While all of this is, of course, possible, it would be more 
charitable and probably more accurate to suggest that, in concentrating on a worst case 
scenario, Britain’s naval leaders were simply being prudent. Having discovered that 
Tirpitz had done what he had always previously denied, namely ordered warships in 
advance of the published German schedule, they were simply no longer willing to believe 
his assurances that this had no implications for time of completion. Indeed, his robust 
assertions to the contrary and overly pained response to the evident British disbelief 
probably reinforced the conviction that a German acceleration, if it had not occurred 
already, would certainly take place in the future. As Fisher explained the matter in rather 
forthright terms to Sir Arthur Davidson, King Edward VII’s Assistant Private Secretary: 
‘The fact is we must have a large margin against lying!’76 Gerald Spicer, an assistant 
clerk at the Foreign Office, put the matter more delicately, but no less appositely. ‘The 
really important point to us,’ he explained, ‘is not what the Germans say they have done 
in the way of shipbuilding or what they intend to do, but what they can do when the need 
arises.’77 This was also the point that both Grey and Asquith made in the House of 
Commons.
78
 
Second, in terms of the historiography of pre-war British intelligence, the fact that 
the British Admiralty possessed any significant information on German constructive 
capacity, even if the full context was not appreciated, and that they received timely and 
accurate warning of advanced German warship ordering provides a useful corrective to 
some of the negative assessments that exist of pre-war British intelligence. In 1983, in an 
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influential article, Nicholas Hiley argued that there was a general failure of British 
intelligence against Germany before 1914, largely due to the lack of any systematic 
means of acquiring information.
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 The opportunities for obtaining naval intelligence 
were, in his estimation, particularly poor.
80
 In another important work, Paul Kennedy 
echoed this view, referring in general to the ‘thin diet of information’ on naval matters 
acquired during the pre-war era and making particular note of the deficiencies in 
intelligence during the 1909 naval scare.
81
 Without exaggerating British intelligence 
success, it is clear from the range of sources used by the Admiralty during the 1909 panic 
that Hiley and Kennedy paint too negative a picture. Not only were naval attachés 
systematically gathering useful data, but valuable product was also coming in on a 
regular basis from a range of other special agencies, most notably Trevor Dawson. At the 
same time, the filtering process was sufficiently acute to ensure that sources that might be 
considered suspect, such as Mulliner, were being assessed and disregarded, even when 
the news they brought might have been considered supportive of Admiralty policy. 
Collectively, this represents a much more competent and thorough naval intelligence 
system than historians have previously given the Admiralty credit for. 
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